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China had experienced long-term economic growth since the reform in 1978. 
With the communism system shifts in the socialist market economy, the 
country's legal institution and administration are facing corruption's challenge. 
President Xi Jinping takes action against deep corruption in China after coming 
to power in 2013. To observe the impact of the second stage of the anti-
corruption campaign on provincial economic development since the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China in 2015 to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
in 2017, this project downloads and extracts public records from the National 
Supervision Committee of the People ’s Republic of China and the Disciplinary 
Inspection Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, combining public information to build anti-corruption effect variables. 
Data are distributed from 2015.10 to 2017.12. This project will use a panel data 
model to examine the impact of China's anti-corruption movement on provincial 









Corruption is a serious threat to political stability, society, economic order and market 
freedom in any country. After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China at the end of 2012, the newly elected party’s general secretary Xi Jinping took 
the new leadership of the CPC Central Committee to punish political corruption. The 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has continuously conducted 
investigations on several high-level party and government leaders, generals of the 
People's Liberation Army, and CEOs of state-owned enterprises and institutions. The 
courts have investigated leaders and cadres of the Communist Party of China who 
have violated the law. The anti-corruption campaigns since the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China have reached unprecedented depths in 
Peoples Republics’ history. After the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2015, anti-corruption actions have 
increasingly expanded to the international level. After 2017, the 19th National 
Congress of the CPC formed a normalized anti-corruption system. Since President Xi 
Jinping came to power, the party's work style has increasingly attached the attention 
in China. The strengthening of anti-corruption actions is conducive to the integrity of 
the government and the stability of governing power. However, considering that 
China's GDP growth has slowed down in recent years, will anti-corruption disrupt the 
existing balance in the short term and affect the regional economy? Any significant 
impact of growth? 
Many researchers’ studies have shown the effect of corruption on economic growth. 
Corruption is harmful to the long-term economic growth and may have a positive effect 
in the short term, but there are quite a few studies on the short-term impact of anti-
corruption campaigns on the economy. Many researchers attribute it to the political 
system, but corruption influences economic activities. Since the reform for more than 
three decades, China's economy has rapid growth since the political reform in 1979. 
The communist institution used to be centralized, so the legal system is under 
developing. Local government officials have more power than before because of the 
reform. They are tended to rent-seeking, and corruption of officials became quite 
common in China.  
 
This paper collected seasonal panel data from 31 provinces and cities in China from 
October 2015 to December 2017 and used the panel data model to explore the impact 
of the anti-corruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate. There are two 
major problems: 1. What kind of impact will the corruption incident investigated by the 
Central Discipline Inspection Commission have on the regional economy in the second 
round of anti-corruption campaigns? 2. What kind of mechanism does anti-corruption 
movement affect the economic growth rate? Further, will the areas of different abilities 
of government management be affected differently by anti-corruption campaigns? I will 





Huntington (1968) found that during the period of political modernization, that is, the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, corruption increased rapidly, and then with 
the improvement of the institutions, corruption would decrease again. In China, people 
can generally feel that in the early stage of reform, corruption was very serious, and the 
government's anti-corruption efforts were not great. However, the Chinese 
government's anti-corruption efforts have increased significantly in recent years. 
 
Although researchers have pointed out that under the condition of imperfect institutions, 
some corrupt activities have the function of allocating resources (Aidt, 2003), many 
research studies have a micro perspective to discuss corruption’s formation and 
mechanism. It did not discuss how the anti-corruption process will affect economic 
growth. Most research on corruption and growth is based on empirical analysis (Mauro, 
1995). 
 
Other researchers did previous research on personal ties between those corrupt officials 
who have been caught during the first-stage Anti-Corruption Campaign in 2012-2015 
(Peter, Lu,2018). Their research provides different ways to evaluate two competing 
interpretations of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns. One explanation is that this 
was an attempt by a party within the Chinese Communist Party to cover up and 
eliminate the network of political competitors’ clique. It undermines the pragmatic 
governance of some political elites. Another explanation is that Xi Jinping's suppression 
has implemented the CCP's improved governance structure like the communism 
institutions in the past decades. Corruption behaviours of those officials, especially the 
party members, have reduced people's support and far away from the policy goals. 
Local governments tend to have higher prosecution rates, and the largest network of 
prosecuted officials does not surround most of Xi Jinping's competitors for party leaders. 
China cannot rely on globalization and open economic policies to easily gain benefits 
forever; it is necessary for government internal policy reform and opening.  
 
2.1 Definition of Corruption 
 
Corruption arises from a privilege. There are many problems with corruption behaviour. 
The first is how corruption is measured. All corrupt activities cannot be fully detected, 
and the secondary effects of corrupt activities are difficult to observe. The second is the 
definition of corruption, where inconsistencies in laws between countries do certain 
acts that would be defined as corruption legal in different countries. Instrumental 
variables are appropriate to measure corruption and its causal relationship to economic 
growth. The instrumental variable uses an external variable to measure the change in 
the dependent variable, which then causes a change in the primary dependent 
variable(Mauro,1995). In developing countries, corruption is generally related to 
regulation, while in countries with economies in transition, the extensive participation 
of governments officials in economic activities (including economic regulation) creates 
more corruption activities rather than the old planned economic system. Because 
corruption is related to privileges in the market, the construction of markets and the 
elimination of privileges are important means of beating corruption. 
 
Corruption could be defined as "the act of public power used to pursue personal 
interests in a way that violates the rules" (Jain, 2001). According to this definition, there 
are three important conditions of the corruption: (1) government officials have the 
authority to design and formulate regulatory policies at will; (2) the arbitrariness of 
power makes rent-seeking activities possible; (3) Within the political, management, and 
legal systems, government officials have incentives to use power to rent-seeking (Aidt, 
2003).  
 
There are two main types of corruption: extrajudicial transactions and rent-seeking. 
Rent-seeking behaviour exists mainly in the context of market competition. When 
competition in developing markets is inadequate, individuals in power may engage in 
rent-seeking behaviour. However, the rent-seeking behaviour of non-governmental 
officials is complex and difficult to define as corruption. Extra-legal transactions occur 
in cases where the law is imperfect, and acts that can be morally judged to be corrupt 
cannot be considered illegal because they are not covered by the law. In the absence of 
a sound legal system, corrupt activities are not necessarily illegal in the legal sense. For 
example, gifts and bribes accepted by government officials are concepts that are 
difficult to distinguish in the legal sense. 
2.2 Effective Corruption 
 
Corrupt activities do not always have a bad effect, and sometimes they tend to have a 
certain resource allocation function, which is called effective corruption. Since markets 
and laws do not always work perfectly to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, 
corruption often becomes an alternative mechanism. It is clear that this alternative 
mechanism is not an optimal one, in which parties involved in market activities compete 
for scarce resources, and the efficiency achieved through this mechanism may be higher 
than through other mechanisms. This idea was formalized in the "queuing model" (Lui, 
1985) and the "auction model" (Beck and Maher, 1986). In the queuing model, different 
people have different evaluations of the resources that need to be obtained through 
queuing, and the bribes collected by a bureaucrat reveal the resource appraisers' 
evaluation of the resources. This achieves effective resource allocation. At the same 
time, the bureaucrat does not slow down the queue, because doing so will cause some 
people to drop out of the queue, thereby reducing the total number of bribes. The 
"Auction Model" further pointed out that the essential difference between market 
competition and bribery is not the result of resource allocation, because the same people 
who have a high evaluation of resources get the resources, but it is the initial ownership 
of resources under market competition. The buyer gets the bid of the buyer, and under 
the bribery mechanism, the bureaucrat who has the privilege obtains the bribe. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) studied the impact of bribery on resource allocation in the presence 
of government regulation of enterprises. They believe that bribery is a mechanism for 
the distribution of benefits between politicians and businesses. Without a bribery 
mechanism, politicians may pursue goals that run counter to corporate interests through 
regulation. For example, politicians can require companies to hire too many employees 
to win support from more voters. In the case of a bribery mechanism, politicians may 
work with the enterprise to maximize the benefits of the enterprise and then share the 
benefits of the enterprise. At this time, bribery is a mechanism that allows companies 
to redeem inefficient results caused by politicians in other ways, thereby improving 
Increased corporate efficiency. Unless the goals of the politician and the enterprise 
exactly reflect the goals of social welfare, the results achieved under the bribery 
mechanism can only be non-socially optimal. 
 
2.3 Path Dependence 
 
Although effective corruption can improve the efficiency of resource allocation under 
certain conditions, it is detrimental to social equity and justice. In the "queuing model" 
and "auction model", although the resource allocation is given to the person who has 
the highest evaluation of the resource since the resources held by the government are 
often public resources, the benefits of these resources should not be obtained by the 
bureaucrats who allocate them. In addition, corrupt activities need to be conducted in 
secret, the transaction cost is high, and they themselves consume a lot of resources. If 
corruption becomes a system, path dependence will be generated, making the whole 
society corrupt and out of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). We cannot rule out the 
possibility that corruption is in line with social justice as an illegal act when the law is 
"evil law", nor can we rule out that the current standard of public justice is "evil". 
Corruption may be this possibility of "goodness." To say that corruption undermines 
fairness and justice is based on simple ethics. But regardless of whether corruption itself 
is "evil" or not, if people regard it as "evil", corruption will bring negative effects to 
people, which is equivalent to our later model. There are three reasons for the path 
dependence of corruption: (1) when corruption is widespread in society. It is more 
difficult to monitor corruption (Lui, 1986; Cadot, 1987; Andvig and Moene, 1990); 
After the corrupt elements have had relationships with enough corrupt elements, he 
tends to have relations with other corrupt elements and continue to corrupt(Aidt,2003); 
(3) In a society where most people seek rent and accept bribes, corruption is more 
important than businesses Home has higher returns (Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; 
Acemoglu, 1995). 
 
Although some corrupt activities have a role in allocating resources, this positive effect 
is not enough. Generally speaking, corruption is bad for investment and economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Wei, 2000; Paldam, 2002), has a negative impact on 
income distribution (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), and also increases the size of the informal 
economy (Friedman et al., 2000; Murphy et al., 1993), Reducing human capital 
accumulation, urbanization, financial deepening and international trade. 
 
 
2.4 Government ‘s Role 
 
The government's goal is to be that the government does not regard public welfare 
social welfare goals as its goal, and the other may be that the government pursues social 
welfare. When the government is not pursuing social welfare, political changes (such 
as democratization and decentralization of public services) are prerequisites for anti-
corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Ferejohn, 1986; Aidt and Dutta, 2001; Persson 
et al. , 1997), and to prevent governments from being dominated by special interest 
claims (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In economic research, the starting point of an 
analysis is how to plan the anti-corruption path when the government's goal is social 
benefits. This problem is also true for countries that transform government goals into 
social welfare through political change. Under the assumption of a benevolent 
government, the control of institutions and the punishment of laws are generally 
considered to be an important means of combating corruption. In terms of system 
control, if increased supervision is achieved by investing more manpower, then if the 
supervisors themselves are prone to corruption, the result of increased supervision may 
be an increase in the total amount of corruption in the society rather than a decrease 
(Laffont and Guessan, 1999). In terms of legal punishment, the design of the 
punishment system is very important. If the punishment is mistakenly set as a concave 
function of the number of bribes, it may encourage people to corruption instead of 
inhibiting the occurrence of corrupt activities. In fact, if the problem of system design 
has been solved, corruption may not be eliminated, because from an economic point of 
view, at a specific point in time, anti-corruption is as much a social cost and a social 
benefit as a crime. As a result of the trade-off, the costs that the government needs to 
consider  the cost of fighting against corruption and the cost of motivating government 
officials to abandon corrupt activities under asymmetric information conditions (Aidt, 
2003). If the government wants to further control corruption, it can only be achieved 
under two conditions: one is that the "technology" of anti-corruption has changed, for 
example, the openness of information has improved, or the legal system has been 
improved, making the cost of anti-corruption. Another condition is that the way of 
resource allocation has changed. For example, the construction of the market allows 
economic resources to be allocated more with the help of market mechanisms, and the 
function of resource allocation for corrupt activities is becoming more and more 
important for the entire society. Less important; currently, anti-corruption does not 
necessarily affect the sustainable economic growth. 
 
Legal construction and market construction are two important ways to combat 
corruption. Legal construction can effectively reduce the cost of anti-corruption, while 
market construction can change the way resources are allocated, making the resource 
allocation function of corrupt activities more efficient. The nature of anti-corruption 
varies in different transition economies. In Russia, the economic transformation was 
achieved in a radical way. The problem there was a lack of an effective definition of 
private property rights, which led to corruption (Varese, 1997), so the primary task of 
anti-corruption was to build a legal system. 
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                                Table 3.1 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of corruption officials among 31 provinces from the 
4th quarter of 2015 to the 4th quarter of 2017. This paper collected data from the 
National Supervision Committee of the People ’s Republic of China and the 
Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China for empirical analysis. From 2015 to 2017, NSC and DIC have reported more 
than 400 regional investigations. I extracted lists from NSC and DIC data and collected 
data in conjunction with the public records of local judicial agencies. Each corruption 
case record in my data set includes name, administrative level, academic qualifications, 
amount of corruption, trial status, investigation time, and region belonging. The data 
set includes 11 categories and 478 corrupt officials reviewed. Also, I gathered panel 
data samples, including Mainland China‘s provincial growth data from the 4th quarter 




Figure 3.1 indicates that there are 478 province-level corrupt officials in 31 provinces 
and cities from 2015.10 to 2017.12. It can be seen that there are huge differences in 
different regions. It is obvious that there is no significant regional gathering. 
 
3.2 Analytical Model 
 
I use the pronounce judgment’s amount of the corrupt provincial officials as a measure 
of the degree of anti-corruption and explored whether the impact was cumulative and 
long-term during the sample period based on the short-term impact. Panel data samples 
from the fourth quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. There are many factors 
that influence economic growth. According to the Solow growth model, per capita 
wealth and savings rate affects the rate of economic growth, control variables use the 
log of income per capita. 
  




Ygdpr_it, the dependent variable, is the seasonal GDP growth rate of each province. 
Cor_it is the number of corrupt officials in the province in a quarter, which is an 
independent variable.  
ln yit is the log income per capita in RMB at the current quarter.  
γt is a seasonal fixed effect that controls common factors that affect the economic 
growth of each province at the same time. 
δi is a province fixed effect that controls those effects that do not change over time, 
such as the provincial economy factors of growth, such as geographic features.  
ξit is the error term.   
 
There are technical differences between provinces, and the easier it is for backward 
provinces to learn and imitate advanced provinces to improve their production 
efficiency and narrow the gap, the economic growth rate of backward provinces will be 
higher, so I control this factor through the quarterly time fixed effect. Also, due to the 
strict residency policy, the migration and the local tax collecting is really stable (Chan 
and Li, 1999) so the effect of migration is not significant. Because the analysis uses 
quarterly data, the influence of anti-corruption campaign to economic growth may have 
time-sequence, put a Cor it-1 (the amount record of corrupt officials lagged a season) 
can solve this problem. 
     
3.3. Analysis Results 
 
This paper uses a fixed effect to analyze the panel data model while controlling the 
related time and regional differences. This project is using STATA to perform a 
regression analysis on the fixed effect model. The control variable is selected according 
to the Solow growth model. The log of income per capita is used to examine the impact 
of the anti-corruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate. At the same time, 
on the basis of the original model, a lagged variable of the number of corrupt officials 
was added to the model to investigate the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on 
local economic growth, and the cross-section regression analysis of the cumulative 
effect of officials' falling was conducted during the sample period. In order to ensure 
the reliability of the regression analysis results, this paper will also perform endogenous 
tests. This section explores the duration of the impact and further analyzes whether the 
impact is cumulative and long-term during the sample period. 
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Table 3.2 is descriptive Statistics of main variables. YGdpr_it is the quarterly growth 
rate year by year, the average is 7.5%. ln yit is the ln income per capita in RMB current 





































































   











Table 3.3  Brackets are standard errors, ***/**/* represent significance level at 1%, 
5% and 10%   
 
Table 3.3 is basic regression. The first column uses POOL regression, which does not 
control both provincial and time fixed effects. The coefficient of corrupt officials in the 
first column is -0.136, which is significant at the 10% level. The second column controls 
the provincial fixed effects. The coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.005, which is not 
significant. The third column controls both provincial and time fixed effects; the 
coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.021, which is not significant. First to the third 
column shows that the short-term growth has been affected by fallen corrupt officials, 
although the effect is limited. The fourth column added the lagged log of the income 
per capita as the control variable. The coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.030, which 
is not significant. The fifth column changed the control variable to the log of last year’s 
income per capita. The coefficient of the corrupt officials is -0.021, which is still not 
significant. The fourth and fifth column shows that marginal impact to the short-term 
growth is not significant, which means the anti-corruption campaign did less effect on 
provincial economic growth even the provincial level leaders has been announced that 
they have illegal corruption cases. 
 



















































































   






























Table 3.4  Brackets are standard errors, ***/**/* represent significance level at 1%, 
5% and 10% 
 
Table 3.4 is going to test if there is a continuous effect on the growth rate. The first 
column added the last quarter’s corrupt officials as the control variable, also controls 
both the provincial and time fixed effects, the second column added original control 
variable the log income per capita in RMB at last quarter. The coefficient of Cor_it-1 
and Cor_it-3 is not significant, which means there is no significant dynamic delayed 
effect; the limited effect to economic growth would appear in the current quarter. 
Column 3 to 5 has different Cor_its, Column 3 is Corit-1 month, column 4 is Corit-2 
months, and column 5 is Corit-3 months. The coefficient of the different time’s corrupt 
officials in column 3-5 is not significant, which means there is no significant delayed 
effect and the effect duration is short. 
 
Column 6 is the cross-section regression of two years' data. We can see that it is still 
not significant. So, the effect of the anti-corruption campaign is limited by short-term. 
 
 

























  -1.769 
  (1.363) 
  -3.181 
  (6.731) 
  61.249 
  (71.308) 
    31 
   0.048 
Table 3.5 
 
Table 3.5 is the endogeneity test of the past years’ data to see if there is any relationship 
between the officials and the past growth. In this test, the dependent variable is the 
number of corrupt officials of 2 years. 
In column 1, independent variables are 2015’s average lnyit and YGdprit 
In column 2, independent variables are 2014-2015’s average lnyit and 2014’s YGdprit 
In column 3, independent variables are 2013-2015’s average lnyit and 2013’s YGdprit 
The results are not significant at any level. Past three year's growth cannot predict the 




In the theoretical section, the paper describes the causes and effects of corruption and 
the basis of the anti-corruption campaign in China. The empirical part collected 
seasonal panel data from 31 provinces and cities in China from October 2015 to 
December 2017. It used the panel data model to explore the impact of the anti-
corruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate. 
 
The Anti-Corruption Campaign has a short-term negative effect on the provincial GDP 
growth rate, and there is no remarkable delayed effect in month/quarter scale. The 
negative effect on provincial growth may only last a few weeks. The negative impact 
of the anti-corruption campaign on short-term economic growth may be due to the 
replacement of corrupt officials. However, this negative impact is not significant and is 
acceptable. 
 
After arguing that an increase in corruption cases would have a limited adverse effect 
on economic growth, there was no negative effect on long-term economic growth over 
the sample period. This limited negative perception was demonstrated to be non-
lagging and continuous by changing the method of calculation of corruption cases. The 
anti-corruption campaign is not significantly affected the long-term GDP growth rate, 
and there is no remarkable delayed effect. That means the anti-corruption campaign is 
essential.  
 
The homogeneity of the number of corrupt officials shows that the centre of the party 
does not generally adjust the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign to local 
economic growth. The anti-corruption movement seems like based on specific rules, 
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